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CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW YORK BUSINESS
CORPORATION LAW OF 1961
ROBERT S. STEV'ENS*
N THE main, corporation statutes in our American jurisdictions have con-
tained regulatory provisions applicable to all corporations without regard to
the size of their membership. Then, as a result of centuries of judicial opinions,
starting in England, corporation statutes have been interpreted as establishing
norms that must be applied without variation to all corporations irrespective
of the size of the shareholding body. It is submitted that all of this judge-
made law has sprung from the unrealistic conception that there are two kinds
of legal persons: the natural and the artificial corporate person. It has.been
inferred that the artificial corporate person has no capacity to act except as
prescribed by statute, that is, (a) that it has no capacity to act beyond the
powers conferred upon it by law or the purposes stated in its certificate of
incorporation; (b) that management of the corporate business is vested ex-
clusively in the board of directors, and that the proportionate vote of share-
holders and directors required by statute for valid corporate action is not
subject to variation by shareholder agreement.
Even though this is an unrealistic starting premise, the deductions are
usually appropriate as applied to corporations with large membership. How-
ever, some of these deductions can also be rationalized with a premise that is
realistic. One of the disadvantages of partnership law is that each partner has
the power, as agent, to bind the firm. One of the advantages of corporation
law is that the power of management-of the business is, by statute and, there-
fore, by agreement between the shareholders, concentrated in the board of
directors. The board is to exercise its authority in the interests of all share-
holders, the minority as well as the majority, and its action is not to be reversed
or controlled by the majority, except as the latter have the power to elect
directors. Other provisions are included in the statutes for the protection of
shareholders, such as those with regard to cumulative voting, voting by classes
of shares and those with-regard to preemptive rights. It is also a part of the
shareholder agreement that the corporate capital shall be risked only. in the
business purposes stipulated in the certificate of incorporation, and, therefore,
a minority can enjoin threatened ultra vires action.
But the formalistic ritual of the fictionist does not always coincide with
the realities of life in a close corporation. Perhaps the chief difference between
the publicly held and the close corporation is that in the former there is a
separation between ownership and control which in itself requires some statu-
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tory regulation. In the close corporation, however, ownership and control are
identical, or it is the desire of the membership that they should be. The close
corporation is in reality a partnership with the added benefit of limited lia-
bility, and it is managed and conducted informally as a partnership, and,
usually, harmlessly so from any standpoint of public policy or interest. Its
members are not indifferent proxy-signers. They may want an active voice in
management, action by unanimous vote, or at least a veto on corporate action.
They may want permanency in office, protection as to salaries, representation
on the board of directors, perhaps by classes of shares, restrictions on the
transferability of shares, or even the possibility of a ready and easy procedure
for dissolution, as in the case of partnerships.
A statutory provision should be interpreted and applied in the light of
the purpose or the interest it was designed to serve. But conceptions as to the
legislative purpose and intent may differ. Thus, in the Benintendi case,' the
three shareholders, each owning one third of the shares, amended the by-laws
to provide that action by the shareholders could be taken only by unanimous
vote of the shareholders and action by the directors could be taken only by
unanimous vote of the directors. These amendments were found to be in-
trinsically unlawful because they contravened an essential part of the state
policy as expressed in the Stock Corporation Law, that is, the proportion of
votes required by the statute for action by the shareholders or directors. "The
State, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting their individual liabilities
for business debts by forming themselves into an entity separate and distinct
from the persons who own it, demands in turn that the entity take a prescribed
form and conduct itself, procedurally, according to fixed rules."2 No differen-
tiation could be made between a publicly held and a close corporation. As is
well known, the legislature was prompted to express its intention otherwise
in Stock Corporation Law, Section 9. On the other hand, the purpose of Stock
Corporation Law, Section 16, requiring a mortgage to be approved by the
holders of two thirds of the shares, given in writing or by vote at a share-
holders' meeting, is to protect the shareholders against improvident, collusive
or other unwise acts of the directors; and that purpose was held to have been
fulfilled and the mortgage to be valid when unanimously approved by all the
directors who held more than two thirds of the shares, even though there was
not strict compliance with the section requiring approval in writing or by vote
at a meeting of shareholders as such. The procedure there followed can
occur in a small corporation but would be unlikely to happen in a corporation
of large membership. 3
1. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829, 159 A.L.R. 280
(1945), noted in 45 Colum. L. Rev. 960 (1945), 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 513 (1945), 19 St.
John's L. Rev. 144 (1945).
2. Id. at 118, 60 N.E.2d at 831, 159 A.L.R. at 283.
3. In re Endicott Laundry Co., Inc., 128 Misc. 413, 219 N.Y. Supp. 632 (1926).
Accord, Gamaldi v. Colon, 79 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1935). Cf. In re Lincoln Bakery, Inc., 18
F. Supp. 998 (D. Mass. 1937).
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It has been suggested from time to time that there should be a separate
law adapted to the problems peculiar to close corporations. The difficulty has
been to find a formula which adequately draws the line between the "small,"
"close" or "family" corporation and the "large" or "quasi-public" corporation.
The Joint Legislative Committee decided that it would be more practicable to
have one Business Corporation Law and to inject into it some special provi-
sions applicable to and usable by close corporations. As will be noted later,
resort was had to a backhanded way of making some of these provisions
applicable' only to "close" corporations. First, the provision will not apply to
a corporation the shares of which are traded on a national securities exchange.
That is only a partial exclusion; it will not exclude unlisted corporations which
may, nevertheless, have a large membership. Second, the provision can be
inserted in the certificate of incorporation only if that is done with the unani-
mous approval of the holders of all the shares. If the membership is large,
such unanimous approval is not likely to be obtainable. 4
PRovIsIoNs RELATING TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Incorporation and Organization
Section 401, though it can apply generally to the formation of a corpora-
tion of any size, may be of special interest when it is planned to incorporate
the business of an individual or of a partnership. That section provides that
"one or more natural persons of the age of twenty-one years or over may act
as incorporators of a corporation to be formed under this chapter." Thus
it will be possible for one or two persons to incorporate themselves. Further-
more, the existing qualifications as to residence, citizenship and subscription
for shares have been eliminated. It will no longer be necessary to incorporate
through "dummies" who meet the requirements of the present law as to the
number and the qualifications of incorporators. 5
Under Section 404, after the certificate of incorporation has been filed
by the Department of State and the corporate existence has begun, an organi-
zation meeting is to be held, either within or without the state, for the election
of directors to hold office until the first annual meeting, the adoption of by-
laws and the transaction of such other business as may come before the
meeting. Since it is provided that any action permitted to be taken at the
organization meeting may be taken without a: meeting if each incorporator
or his attorney-in-fact signs an instrument setting forth the action so taken,
4. For other discussions of the new statute, see Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close
Corporation in New York under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev.
1 (1961) and Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
42-67 (1961).
5. One or more persons may incorporate under the following statutes: Iowa Code Ann.
(1960 Supp.) § 496A. 48; Ky. Rev.,Stat. Ann. (1956) § 271.025; Mich. Comp. Laws (1959
Supp.) § 21.3; Wis. Stat. (1959) § 180.44. See Henn, Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises §§ 257-290 (1961).
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the organization of a corporation formed by one, or even more than one
incorporator is rendered very simple.
The Court of Appeals has held that the law permits the incorporation of
a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability, provided that it
is not accompanied by fraud, misrepresentation or illegality. 6 One significant
instance of a denial of immunity from personal liability is where there has
been provided an obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the nature and
magnitude of the corporate undertaking. 7
Management Structure
It is not required in Section 402 that the number of directors shall be
set forth in the certificate of incorporation or that the names of the first direc-
tors be stated therein. Instead, it is provided in Section 702 that the number
of directors may be fixed by the by-laws, or by action of the directors or
shareholders under a by-law adopted by the shareholders. It would be normal,
therefore, for the number to be fixed originally in the by-laws adopted by the
incorporators at the organization meeting and for that number to be then
elected.
There is no statutory restriction that directors have to be shareholders
or that any proportion of them have to be citizens or residents of the state.
These or other qualifications may be prescribed in the certificate of incorpora-
tion or the by-laws. However, it is required that the number of directors
constituting the entire board shall not be less than three. This may be
criticized as inconsistent with the authorization of a single incorporator. There
may be one shareholder, but there must be three directors. Some relief from
this abnormality may be found under Section 707, which, though providing
that a majority of the entire board of directors shall constitute a quorum,
still permits the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws to fix a quorum
at less than a majority but not less than one third thereof, which could be one.
So, with a board of three directors, the one who incorporated himself can
constitute himself a quorum for the transaction of corporate business. It
is being recommended that the 1962 Legislature adopt the recent amendment
to the Delaware law, effective in the summer of 1961, providing that when all
the shares of a corporation are owned beneficially and of record by either one
6. Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 300 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955),
noted in 24 Ford. L. Rev. 685 (1955), 10 Sw. LJ. 77 (1956), 24 U. Cin. L. Rev. 603 (1955).
7. Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); Automotrizdel Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1
(1957), noted in 30 Calif. L. Rev. 538 (1957), 56 Mich. L. Rev. 299 (1957); Francis 0.
Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669 (Ct. App. D.C. 1959); 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law
and Practice § 756 (1959); Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 146
(1961); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1381 (1938). The advantages and disadvantages of "thin" finaricing,
i.e., a thin ratio between capital and debt, is discussed in Henn, id. at §§ 166 and 261-262.
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or two shareholders, the number of directors may be less than three but not
less than the number of shareholders. 8
If it is desired that each shareholder or faction of shareholders shall
have representation on the board of directors, advantage can be taken of
Sections 501 and 703, under which the certificate of incorporation can provide
for the division of shares into classes and for the election of one or more
directors by the holders of shares of each class, voting as a class.
Classification of shares may be used also to effect a reverse situation,
namely, to concentrate in one faction the right to elect directors. This can
be done by classifying into voting and non-voting shares and issuing the
voting shares to the group intended to have this control over the election.
It should be noted that though, under Section 501, the certificate of incorpora-
tion may deny, limit or otherwise define the voting rights of shares of any
class, there is, in Section 613, the qualification "except as otherwise provided
in this chapter." Section 804 reads that notwithstanding any provision in the
certificate of incorporation to the contrary, the holders of shares of a class
shall be entitled to vote and to vote as a class upon any amendment that
would adversely affect or subordinate the rights of the holders of the shares of
that class. A similar provision is found in Section 903 in the event that a
proposed merger or consolidation would have like effect upon the rights of
the holders of a class of shares. Sections 620 and 11059 require the consent
of all shareholders, non-voting as well as voting, to include in the certificate of
incorporation a provision as to the control of directors or an agreement for
dissolution. On the other hand, a limitation on voting rights confined to a
denial of the right to vote -in the election of directors will have a more extensive
effect, for, in a few sections of the act, the right to vote on particular matters
is given to those "entitled to vote in the election of directors." This is so with
regard to voting upon by-laws, Section 601, and upon dissolution in the event
of a deadlock, Section 1104.
When the shareholding interests are not equal, consideration can be given
to the possible effectiveness of having the certificate of incorporation require
cumulative voting under Section 618. An alternative would be to resort to
Sections 616 and 709, which contain the substance of Stock Corporation Law,
Section 9 and permit the certificate of incorporation to require a greater quorum
at shareholders' and directors' meetings and a greater vote in each case than
would otherwise be prescribed by law. It is to be noted that such a require-
ment would not be valid if contained in the by-laws,' 0 and that notice of the
existence of such a provision must appear on the share certificates issued by
the corporation.
8. Dela. Gen. Corp. L. § 141 as amended by ch. 171, Laws 1961. Such change would
be made in Section 702. -
9. See infra note 34 as to cbange of section number.
10. In re William Faehndrich, Inc, 2 N.Y.2d 468, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957).
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Solidity of voting can be obtained through a voting trust agreement under
Section 621, without provision having to be made therefor in the certificate
of incorporation.
Significant contributions to the law of New York are contained in Section
620. Though paragraph (a) is not exclusively applicable to close corporations,
it can be especially useful in the conduct of a busniess enterprise of that type.
It provides:
(a) An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing
and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any
voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein pro-
vided, or as they may agree, or as determined in accordance with a
procedure agreed upon by them.
An agreement between shareholders to vote their shares "as they may
agree" is, as was said in Helns v. Duckworth," like the statutory obligation
of employers and unions to bargain in good faith. In that case, there was an
agreement that the survivor of the only two shareholders should have an
option to buy the shares of the deceased shareholder at $10 or at a price to
be agreed on in January of any year. Seven years later one of the parties died
when, concededly, each share was worth $80. The other party tendered the
administratrix his check at the rate of $10 a share and demanded delivery of
the shares. Neither party had ever proposed a change in the price. The ad-
ministratrix brought an action for the cancellation of the agreement. An
affidavit of the defendant stated that it was never his intention at any time to
consent to any change in the price. It was held that his failure to disclose
this fixed intent to his corporate business "partner" was a flagrant breach of
a fiduciary duty. "We believe that the holders of closely held stock in a
corporation such as shown here bear a duty to deal fairly, honestly and openly
with their fellow stockholders and make disclosure of all essential informa-
tion."' 2 This conception of the fiduciary relation between the shareholders in
a close corporation merits wider recognition and enforcement.
That it is legal for some or all shareholders to agree to vote alike in the
election of directors was established by the dictum in Manson v. Curtis' and
the decision in Clark v. Dodge.14 Paragraph (a) of Section 620 will sanction
agreements for pooling votes on some or all matters for shareholder decision
as well as in the election of directors. Standing alone such an agreement would
not be self-executing and a threatened breach by some of the parties might
precipitate litigation. The result might be similar even if the parties adopted
11. 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957), noted in 72 Harv. L. Rev. 555 (1959), 36 Texas
L. Rev. 829 (1958), 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1171 (1958).
12. Helms v. Duckworth, id. at 487.
13. 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559, Ann. Cas. 191SE 247 (1918).
14. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1930), noted in 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 336 (1936), 36
Colurn. L. Rev. 836 (1936), 21 Minn. L. Rev. 103 (1936), 13 N.Y.UL. Rev. 585 (1936), 11
St. John's L. Rev. 117 (1936).
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the suggestion in this paragraph of agreeing to vote "in accordance with a
procedure agreed upon by them," for example, to vote as directed by an umpire
selected by them.15 However, Section 609 anticipates another possibility
which could make the agreement self-executing, that is, that the parties give
an irrevocable proxy to one person to vote in their behalf. Section 609 is a
restatement of Stock Corporation Law, Section 47-a with this amendment added.
On the other hand, an advance agreement upon some procedure for a re-
conciliation of differences, which would become effective only if and when
the parties find themselves unable to agree, may be found more desirable than
an advance commitment to the decision of one who has been given an ir-
revocable proxy.
It is often the desire, and even the practice, of the members of an "in-
corporated partnership" to conduct the business with the informality of a
partnership while enjoying other advantages of incorporation. Sometimes, they
may see no utility or necessity in holding formal meetings. Section 615 con-
tains a general authorization that any action that may be taken by vote of the
shareholders may be taken without a meeting on the written consent of the
holders of all shares entitled to vote thereon.
They may wish to dispense with the formality of action by the board of
directors or even to deprive the directors of some of the functions of manage-
ment of the business. The substance of General Corporation Law, Section 13 (2),
that the certificate of incorporation may contain any provision for the regula-
tion of its business and the conduct of its affairs and any limitation upon the
powers of its directors, has been carried into Sections 402 and 601, but the
qualification in Section 13 that the limitation upon the powers of the directors
must not exempt them from the performance of any obligation or duty imposed
by law, coupled with the orthodox view that the power of management of the
corporate business is vested exclusively in the board of directors, has created
considerable doubt as to the validity of any such limitations contained in the
certificate of incorporation.
With respect to an agreement between some, but not all, shareholders to
use their best efforts to keep each other in office as directors and as officers
and to make no change in salaries or policy without consent of all the parties,
it was held that "The power to unite ... is limited to the election of directors
and is not extended to contracts whereby limitations are placed on the power
of the directors to manage the business of the corporation by the selection of
agents at defined salaries."' 6
15. In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), noted in 36 Calif. L. Rev. 281 (1948), 60 Harv.
L. Rev. 651 (1947), 46 Mich. L. Rev. 70 (1947), 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738 (1948), 96 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 121 (1947), two of three shareholders agreed to abide by the decision of a
designated arbitrator. When one of the parties voted contrary to the arbitrator's decision,
it was held that her votes, cast in breach of her agreement, should not be counted.
16. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 329, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (1934).
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A similar agreement between a majority, but not all, of the shareholders
provided that the plaintiff was to manage the corporate business and shape and
control corporate policy and that the president was to be only a nominal and
non-interfering head of the corporation. The Court of Appeals held that the
intent to have a passive president included the intent to have passive direc-
tors and that this violated the statutory provision which vested management of
corporate affairs in a board of directors. "Clearly the law does not permit the
stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors."'
7
In Clarke v. Dodge, the agreement was assented to by all the shareholders
and provided (a) that Dodge, as a shareholder, would vote for Clark as a
director, (b) as a director, he would continue Clark as general manager, so
long as he proved faithful, efficient and competent, and (c) that Clark should
always receive as salary or dividends one fourth of the net income. It is to be
noted that the board retained authority to remove Clark for incompetence and
some discretion in determining what was "net income."18 The Court said:
If the enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not
even, in any perceptible degree, the public-one sees no reason for
holding it illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the broad
provision of section 27. . . Where the directors are the sole stock-
holders, there seems to be no objection to enforcing an agreement
among them to vote for certain people as officers. . . . If there was
any invasion of the powers of the directorate under that agreement, it
is so slight as to be negligible; and certainly there is no damage
suffered by or threatened to anybody. 1
Another agreement between the holders of all the shares of a New Jersey
corporation vested the management of the theatre business of that corporation
in a New York corporation for a period of nineteen years unless the manage-
ment should be changed as a result of arbitration. The parties stipulated that
because the agreement was made in New York, its validity should be determined
by the law of New York. It was held that the restriction here, depriving the
directors of the power to select or change the manager, went far beyond the
agreement in Clark v. Dodge and was invalid under Section 27 of the New
York General Corporation Law.2 0 But one may ask, "Why, if that was the
arrangement agreed upon by the holders of all the shares?"
17. Manson v. Curtis, supra note 13 at 323, 119 N.E. at 562, Ann. Cas 1918E at 251.
18. 269 N.Y. 410, 417, 199 N.E. 641, 643 (1936), noted in 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 336
(1936), 36 Colum. L. Rev. 585 (1936), 21 Minn. L. Rev. 103 (1936), 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev.
585 (1936), 11 St. John's L. Rev. 117 (1936).
19. Clark v. Dodge, id. at 415, 199 N.E. at 642.
20. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948), noted in 14 Brooklyn L. Rev. 282 (1948), 17 Ford. L. Rev. 95 (1948),
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1948), 43 IIl. L. Rev. 561 (1948), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 119 (1948).
Accord, Matter of Abbey (Myerson), 274 App. Div. 389, 68 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1948),
aff'd w.o. opinion, 299 N.Y. 557, 85 N.E.2d 789 (1949). A preincorporation agreement
that management and operation of the corporation should be administered exclusively by
the holders of Class B shares and that each of the parties should be employed for ten years
at a stipulated salary, was held to be invalid as violative of N.Y. Gen. Comp. Law, Sec-
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The above decisions were interpretations of what was assumed to be
the legislative intention. From that standpoint, there are sections in the
Business Corporation Law that will have a bearing upon those decisions and
indicate a different legislative intention.
As already indicated, the certificate of incorporation may require that
the proportion needed for a quorum or vote of directors shall be greater than
that specified in the act (Section 709).
Section 706 provides that if the certificate of incorporation or by-laws so
provide, any or all of the directors may be removed without cause by vote of
the shareholders, but protection is given against any such removal that would
be inconsistent with any existing right to vote cumulatively or by classes of
shares.
Paragraph (d) of Section 706 provides that an action to procure a judg-
ment for the removal of a director for cause may be brought by the Attorney
General or by the holders of ten per cent of the outstanding shares, whether
or not entitled to vote, and that the court may bar from reelection any direc-
tor so removed for a period fixed by the court. It will be recalled that Section
61 of the General Corporation Law provides that a proceeding for removal
of a director for cause may be brought only by the Attorney General. It
will be recalled also that the common law right to remove for cause by vote
of the shareholders may become impracticable if the certificate of incorpora-
tion contains a Section 9 provision.2 '
Under Section 715(b), the certificate of incorporation may provide that
all officers, or that specified officers, shall be elected by the shareholders
instead of by the board, and under Section 717, an officer elected by the share-
holders may be removed, with or without cause, only by a vote of the share-
holders.
Perhaps the most far-reaching provision contained in the new Law for
enabling members of a close corporation to modify the normal incidents of
corporateness is found in paragraph (b) of Section 620. This reads:
tion 27. See Comment, Shareholders' Agreements and the Statutory Norm, 43 Cornell L.Q.
68 (1957). For discussions and citations bearing upon the possibility of modifying some
of the normal incidents of corporateness, see 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice
Chs. 8 and 9 (1959), and Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises Ch. 10 (1961).
1 Hornstein, id. at § 171, reminds us that originally in England management was in
the hands of the shareholders and they were the source .of the directors' powers, and that
from 1929 to 1947, the English statute did not require a board of directors in a "private
company." See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696, 713 (1960):
Perhaps now is the time to admit the truth that the board of directors as a group
of Platonic guardians is no longer, if it ever was, a necessary part of the structure
of a corporation. If the real owners, the shareholders, desire to dispense with it,
it should be up to them to choose other agents, or if they so desire, to retain
the entire corporate management themselves. Originally they had this power.
Why not now?
It is conceded that in a public issue corporation, a board of directors would be a necessity.
21. In re Burkin (Katz), 1 N.Y.2d 570, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956), poted'in 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 1323 (1956).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(b) A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited
by law as improperly restrictive of the discretion or powers of
the directors in their management of corporate affairs as provided
in this chapter shall neverthelesi be valid: . . .
"Otherwise prohibited by law as restrictive of the discretion or powers
of the directors" is in contrast with the wording of General Corporation Law
Section 13(2) which does not permit any limitation that would "exempt them
[directors] from the performance of any obligation of duty imposed by law."
In addition, Section 701, which states that the business of a corporation
shall be managed by its board of directors, carries this important qualification,
"subject to any provision in the certificate of incorporation authorized by
paragraph (b) of section 620," making clear the legislative intention that a
provision in the certificate of incorporation can control the discretion and
powers of the directors. In this respect, the two provisions permit going
beyond the decision in Clark v. Dodge where the limitation was a slight
impingement on the provision in Section 37 of the General Corporation Law.
A limitation authorized by Section 620(b) is recognized in Section 701 as a
permissible limitation upon the authority of the board of directors to manage
the business of the corporation. 2
The wording of Section 701, "Subject to any provision in the certificate
of incorporation authorized by paragraph (b) of section 620 [title of section],
the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors . . . ,"
is susceptible of alternative interpretations: (1) that the certificate might pro-
vide that the business shall be managed otherwise than by a board of directors,
or (2) that there must be a board of directors but Section 620(b) permits
the creation of a sterilized board. In either case, it is provided in paragraph
(e) of Section 620 that the effect of any provision authorized by paragraph (b)
shall be to relieve the directors and impose upon the shareholders consenting
22. Section 620 is commented upon in 75 Harv. L. Rev. 852 (1962). See also,
Hoffman, op. cit. supra note 4 at 5 and Kessler, op. cit. supra note 4 at 44. Section 620(b)
is a revised version of N.C. Gen. Stat., § 55-73(b) (Supp. 1959):
Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are at the time or subse-
quently become generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers
or brokers, no writteh agreement to which all of the shareholders have actually
assented, whether embodied in the charter or by-laws or any side agreement in
writing and signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase of
the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its business or division
of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it
were a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
appropriate only between partners. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section or of this chapter, the provisions of G.S. 55-59(a) shall not apply to such
agreement. A transferee of shares covered by such agreement who acquires them
with knowledge thereof is bound by its provisions.
Section 55-24(a) reads:
Subject to the provisions of the charter, the by-laws or agreement between the
shareholders otherwise lawful, the business and affairs of a corporation shall be
managed by a board of directors.
See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,
34 N.C.L. Rev. 432 (1956).
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thereto the liability for managerial acts or omissions that is imposed on direc-
tors to the extent that and so long as the discretion and powers of the directors
is controlled by any such provision.
There are limitations upon the use of Section 620(b). In the first place
a provision authorized by it is valid only so long as the shares of the corpora-
tion are not traded on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in
an over-the-counter market. Though this restriction does not exactly coincide
with a definition of a dose corporation, it does exclude most of the publicly
held corporations. More important and exclusive is the requirement that a
provision authorized by the section will not be valid unless authorized by the
unanimous consent of the incorporators or the holders of all the shares, whether
or not entitled to vote. Such unanimity of approval is not likely to be obtain-
able except in a dose corporation.
In an effort to prevent surprise to one- who might become a shareholder
after such a restrictive provision had been adopted, it is required that such a
provision must be contained in the certificate of incorporation and that notice
of it must appear on every certificate for shares. It is also provided in sub-
paragraph (b) (2) that an adopted provision continues to be valid only if a
new shareholder consented to it in writing or had knowledge or notice of it.23
Dissolution
One of the hazards of conducting business as a dose corporation is that
the amicableness, agreement and trust of the associates at the optimistic outset
of the venture may deteriorate into hostility, irreconcilable disagreement as to
policy and management, positions and salaries and complete distrust. If the
associates were partners, rather than shareholders, a termination of the associa-
tion would be readily available through dissolution.
Among the causes for dissolution listed in the Uniform Partnership Law
are: (1) Without violation of the partnership agreement, by the express will
of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified or
by the express will of all the partners; (2) In contravention of the partner-
ship agreement, by the express will of any partner or by the death or bank-
ruptcy of a partner, or by decree of court 4 Interpreting this section, the
Court of Appeals has said: "No one can be forced to continue as partner against
his will. He may be liable for breach of contract. Nothing more."- 5
23. This is the form in which it is being recommended for amendment in 1962.
24. N.Y. Partnership Law § 62.
25. Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 382, 162 N.E. 288, 289 (1928). The partnership
agreement provided that it could be terminated upon sixty days' written notice. The
Court said:
Notwithstanding this clause, however, either party might repudiate it any time.
Then it ended. No agreement can prevent this result. No one can be forced to
continue as partner against his will. He may be liable for breach of contract.
Nothing more.
Accord, Niles v. Leitman, 278 App. Div. 330,'104 N.YS.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1951).
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Courts have taken a different attitude toward the dissolution of corpora-
tions. Under Stock Corporation Law, Section 105, a certificate of voluntary
dissolution may be authorized by the vote of the holders of two thirds of the
shares entitled to vote thereon or upon the written consent of the holders of
all such shares. 26 Under Sections 101 and 102 of the General Corporation Law,
a petition for dissolution may be presented if authorized by a majority of the
directors or the holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote on the
question.2 7 If directors or shareholders are deadlocked, then Section 103 pro-
vides that unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, the
vote of the holders of one half of the shares entitled to vote at an election of
directors shall be sufficient and, if the certificate requires a greater vote of
shareholders than that required by law, then the vote of the holders of one
third of the shares shall be sufficient? 8 Where the petition is approved by the
shareholders, the court is given discretion by Section 106 to entertain or dismiss
the application and, under Section 117, upon an application for a final order,
the court must find: (1) that the case is one ipecified in Article 9, that is,
in the case of a deadlock, that there is in fact a deadlock; (2) that a dissolu-
tion will be beneficial to the shareholders, and (3) that a dissolution will not
be injurious to the public?;9
In the well-known case of In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc.,30 two men had
owned all the shares in equal proportions. Neidorff died and his widow, the
sister of Radom, succeeded to his half interest. The brother and sister disliked
and distrusted each other. In fact, she had brought a derivative suit charging
him with enriching himself at the corporation's expense and assigned this as a
reason for her refusal to sign his salary check. Because of their unresolved
difficulties, they had been unable to elect a third director at the annual meet-
ing. Upon the basis of these facts, Radom presented a petition for dissolution.
The Special Term entertained the petition and ordered a reference to determine
the facts. The Appellate Division ordered that the petition be dismissed and
the Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, affirmed the Appellate Divi-
sion. It is significant that the respondent, in her answering papers, alleged that
Radom had offered her $75,000 for her shares, and, when she rejected this, he
had threatened to have the corporation dissolved and to buy in the business
or, if she should be the purchaser, to start a competing business. The majority
of the Court concluded that, in spite of the feuding, there was no stalemate as
26. To the same effect are N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1001, 615.
27. Like provisions are contained in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1102, 1103.
28. Section 1104 of the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law has this provision in a modified form.
29. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Section 1112 makes changes in this section. It should be
noted that Section 1112 will become Section 1111 if the change mentioned in note 34, infra,
is made.
30. 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954), noted in 68 Harv. L. Rev. 714 (1955), 29
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1485 (1954). Accord, In re Seamerling Operating Co., 307 N.Y. 407, 121
N.E.2d 392 (1954); In re Norton & Schneider, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
In re Admiral Rubber Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 355, 172 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. CL 1958).
492
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
to corporate policies, that the corporate business was flourishing, making an
average annual profit of about $71,000, and that Radom had no grievance
cognizable by a court except as to the non-payment of his salary, which was
not a ground for judicial dissolution. It was held that, since this was not
a case for judicially-imposed death, there was no need for the order of reference.
New Jersey has a similar provision for dissolution by a court in the event
of a deadlock and its Supreme Court held that it was proper to order dissolu-
tion when each of two factions of shareholders had the right to elect two of a
board of four directors, when the board was so deadlocked as to corporate policies
that it did not meet for several years with the result that management had
been dictated by the holder of the majority of the common shares who happened
to be the manager at the time that the deadlock occurred, and who had
refused to pay dividends on the cumulative preferred shares. The court found
that there was a want of that community of interest essential to corporate
operation and that if the petition for dissolution were denied, there would be
no alternative corrective remedy. Dissolution would be in the best interests
of the shareholders, and also in the public interest because the statute required
the business of a corporation to be managed by its board of directors. 31
An encouraging decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court, Erie
County, in In re Pivot Punch & Die Corporatiopn.32 The petitioner and the
respondent each owned one half of the shares. After three years of dissension
as to management and policy, three arbitrators decided that the petitioner's
employment by the corporation should terminate immediately. For the next
three years, the petitioner had no voice in management. The directors were
holding over because of an inability to elect new directors at the last two
annual meetings. The respondent had been controlling the policy and had been
receiving a substantial return for his services and upon his investment and the
petitioner had been receiving nothing. Respondent contended that the peti-
tion should be denied because there was no deadlock of the directors who
agreed with him that there should be no dissolution. But the court pointed
out that the statute is in the alternative, a deadlock of directors or a dead-
lock of shareholders so that they cannot elect directors. The court emphasized
that this was a close corporation, an incorporated partnership, and pointed out
that, under partnership law, when loyalty and confidence between partners
cease, the true partnership ceases. By analogy, when these characteristics no
31. In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159, 13 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1949).
Annot, Dissolution of corporation on ground of intracorporate deadlock or dissension, 13
A.L.R.2d 1260 (1950).
32. 15 Misc. 2d 713, 182 N.YS.2d 459 (1959). Modified by directing that the hear-
ing be before the court and not a referee. Affirmed as modified, 9 A.D.2d 861, 193 N.Y.S.2d
34 (4th Dep't 1959). Cf. Levine v. Styleart Press, Inc, 31 Misc. 2d 106, 217 N.Y.S.2d
688 (Sup. Ct. 1961), holders of two thirds of shares were in fiduciary relation to holder
of one third and were enjoined from dissolving corporation for their individual advantage.
Gaines v. Adler, - A.D.2d -, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Ist Dep't 1962), upheld the complaint
in a minority shareholders' action for dissolution alleging that the corporation was being
exploited exclusively for the private benefit of its managing and controlling shareholders.
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longer exist between the shareholders of a close corporation, the corporation
ceases to be beneficial to the deadlocked shareholders. Distinguishing the
Radom case, the court found that the petition alleged a stalemate, that the
corporation was weak and declining and that dissolution was needed for the
good of the shareholders and of the public. Accordingly, the court appointed
a referee to determine the facts.
Changes which should be helpful in facilitating dissolution when the share-
holders of a close corporation are in irreconcilable conflict have been included
in the Business Corporation Law.
In the first place, it is provided in Section 1104(a) (6) that, notwithstand-
ing any provision in the certificate of incorporation, any holder of shares
entitled to vote in an election of directors may present a petition for dissolution
on the ground that the shareholders are so divided that they have failed, for
a period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
directors.33
In the second place, to specify that a deadlock among shareholders is a
ground for dissolution only when they "are so divided that they cannot elect
a board of directors" is too narrow. This is especially true in view of the provi-
sion in Section 620(b) permitting restrictions upon the discretion of powers of
the directors. It is true also because the shareholders may be in conflict as to
matters of corporate policy as well as in the election of directors, or they
may no longer trust one another, or the conduct of one may be prejudicial
or harmful to the others. Under any of such circumstances, dissolution would
be beneficial to the shareholders and there certainly can be no public interest
in compelling the continuance of an unworkable association. In addition to
stating, as a ground for dissolution, that the shareholders are so divided that
the votes required for the election of directors cannot be obtained, Section 1104
lists as a further ground that there is internal dissension and two or more
factions of shareholders are so divided that dissolution would be beneficial
to the shareholders. It is further provided in Section 1112 that, as criteria
for the court's decision, (1) public interest is of paramount importance when
the action for dissolution is brought by the Attorney General; (2) benefit to
the shareholders is of paramount importance when the proceeding is brought by
the directors of shareholders; and (3) in a proceeding brought because of
deadlock or dissension, dissolution is not to be denied merely because it is
found that the corporate business has been or could be conducted at a profit.
34
Because experience has shown that dissension and distrust can overtake
33. There are similar provisions in Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157-86 (Smith-Hurd
1954), and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.771 (1957).
34. In the Law as passed in 1961, this appears as Section 1112, but it is being con-
sidered that Section 1105 should be transferred from Article 11 on Judicial Dissolution to
Article 10, Non-Judicial Dissolution, as Section 1002. If this change is made Section 1112
will become Section 1111. The minority opinion in In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., supra
note 30, pointed out that the sole issue under N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law, Section 103 is whether
there is a deadlock, not whether the business is being conducted at a profit or loss.
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an originally harmonious family or other group of associates, that contingency
should be guarded against at the outset of a corporate venture. A deadlock is
particularly apt to occur when provision is made for unanimous, or almost
unanimous, vote of directors and shareholders. The Business Corporation Law
has a new provision permitting the certificate of incorporation to contain, if
approved by the holders of all shares, whether or not entitled to vote thereon,
a provision that any shareholder, or the holders of any specified number or
proportion of shares may enforce dissolution, at will or upon the occurrence of
any specified event.35 This provision could be used to supplant the other statu-
tory provisions for dissolution by vote of the shareholders and to have the
possibility of dissolution as readily available as under the Partnership Law and
without judicial proceedings. The inclusion of this provision in the statute
will remove any doubt as to the validity of such an agreement that might
arise under the principle enunciated in the Benintendi decision.3 6 Because of
the importance of an agreement authorized by this section, it must have received
unanimous approval, and it must be contained in the certificate of incorporation
which is to be filed of record and reference to it must be stated on each certifi-
cate for shares.
SUMMARY
Upon the recommendation of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study
Revision of the Corporation Laws, there have been included in the new Busi-
ness Corporation Law, authorizing and regulating both large and small cor-
porations, the various provisions highlighted in the above discussion with the
purpose of adapting New York statute law to some of the more pressing prob-
lems and needs of the close corporation. In adopting the Committee's recom-
mendations, the Legislature has recognized the distinctions between the publicly
held and the close corporations as they exist in day-to-day operation and has
explicitly expressed a legislative intention that the two types of corporations
should be treated differently. It should follow that the specific provisions
referred to should not be regarded as exclusive instances, but as examples for
that different treatment, and that the Law, in all its parts, should be interpreted
to give effect to that legislative purpose and intention.
35. This section appears as Section 1105 in the Law as enacted in 1961 but see
supra note 34. See comment 75 Harv. L. Rey. 852, 855 (1962), Hoffman, op. cit. supra
note 4 at 12, Kessler, op. cit. supra note 4 at 58. Section 1002 is a revised form of N.C.
Gen. Stat. (1959 Supp.) § 55-125(3). See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rev., 432, 447 (1956).
36. Supra note 1. A collection and analysis of the decisional and statute law of the
various jurisdictions will be found in Report of the New York State Law Revision Com-
mission, 1944, pp. 367-377. See Hornstein, A Remedy for Intra-Corporate Abuse-Judicial
Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Shareholder, 40 Colum. L.
Rev. 220 (1940); Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778 (1952); note, Voluntary Dissolution of a Close
Corporation, I Syracuse L. Rev. 489 (1950). Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises §§ 269, 280 (1961); 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice §§ 816-826 (1959);
2 ABA-ILA Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., 493-510 (1960).
